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265 
COMMENTS 
GROW UP VIRGINIA: TIME TO CHANGE OUR FILIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY LAW 
Can you be held liable for your parents‘ living expenses? If you 
live in Virginia, the answer may be yes.
1
 Virginia is one of twenty-
nine states with a ―filial responsibility law‖ requiring adult chil-
dren to financially support their parents under certain circum-
stances.
2
 These rarely enforced laws have created dire conse-
quences for some in states with similar statutes. Virginia should 
review these antiquated requirements to ensure its citizens are 
not subject to  draconian punishment for situations beyond their 
control. 
In recent years, Virginia‘s filial responsibility law has been 
used for purposes not contemplated by its original architects. For 
example, it has allowed a brother, who had run his mother‘s fi-
nances into the ground, to sue his sister to hold her liable for his 
financial mistakes, burdening her with substantial litigation 
fees.
3
 The law has provided a forum for a stepfather to retaliate 
against his wife‘s children after the children petitioned the court 
to replace him as their mother‘s guardian.
4
 It has permitted a 
man to sue his less solvent brother to contribute a greater portion 
 
 1. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016).  
 2. Northwestern MutualVoice Team, Who Will Pay For Mom‟s Or Dad‟s Nursing 
Home Bill? Filial Support Laws And Long-Term Care, FORBES: INVESTING (Feb. 3, 2014, 
8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/northwesternmutual/2014/ 02/03/who-will-pay-for-
moms-or-dads-nursing-home-bill-filial-support-laws-and-long-term-care/#32913a925620 
(listing thirty states that have filial responsibility statutes as of 2014 including Puerto Ri-
co). One of these thirty states—Iowa—repealed its filial responsibility statute in 2015. 
H.F. 157, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015). Therefore, the total currently stands at twenty-
nine states. 
 3. Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, Associate, Pender & Coward (Mar. 
28, 2016) (estimating billing around twenty to thirty hours for the matter). 
 4. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, Partner, Glasser & Macon, P.C. (Mar. 
26, 2016). 
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of their parent‘s luxury assisted living facility bill.
5
 It has spurred 
children of a mentally impaired man to pay for legal advice to 
avoid significant monetary debt.
6
 In contrast, it has benefitted a 
woman, allowing her to successfully hold her sister equally liable 
for their mother‘s costs.
7
 Few lawyers or judges seem to be aware 
of the law,
8
 yet its potential impact could be devastating. 
Other states‘ filial responsibility laws have also generated con-
cern. A recent Pennsylvania case, Health Care & Retirement 
Corp. of America v. Pittas, left many alarmed about the prospect 
that the law may punish individuals solely as a result of their bio-
logical relationship.
9
 In Pittas, a nursing home used Pennsylva-
nia‘s filial responsibility law to force liability upon a son for his 
mother‘s entire nursing home debt after she moved to Greece 
without paying her bill.
10
 Some worry that Virginia nursing 
homes will begin to use the filial responsibility statute to impose 
similar liability.
11
 
While American life expectancy grows each year, citizens‘ long-
term savings do not keep up.
12
 Americans are also becoming in-
creasingly mobile, unlike in the past when extended families 
tended to reside in the same locality, leaving many parents geo-
graphically distant from their children.
13
 The trend toward large 
 
 5. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, Director of Elder Law, Thomp-
sonMcMullan, P.C. (Apr. 7, 2016). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Acting as a caretaker for her mother, a daughter incurred high monetary costs 
and physical injuries, including multiple fractured vertebrae and her husband underwent 
two hernia surgeries due to lifting the ninety-seven-year-old mother. Telephone Interview 
with Kathy Pryor, Elder Law Attorney, Va. Poverty Law Ctr. (Mar. 30, 2016). 
 8. Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, supra note 3 (describing little 
awareness of the statute among both lawyers and judges in the Southeastern Virginia le-
gal community).  
 9. See Mari Park, The Parent Trap: Health Care & Retirement Corporation of Amer-
ica v. Pittas, How it Reinforced Filial Responsibility Laws and Whether Filial Responsibil-
ity Laws Can Really Make You Pay, 5 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 441, 443 (2013) 
(discussing the implications of Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 
A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)). 
 10. 46 A.3d at 720. 
 11. See Deborah Elkins, Family Ties: A Little-Known „Filial Support‟ Statute, VA. 
LAW. WKLY. (Feb. 17, 2015); Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7 (noting 
buzz about nursing homes aiming to do this in recent years). 
 12. See Emily Brandon, Poverty Increasing Among Retirees, U.S. NEWS (May 21, 2012, 
11:50 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/articles/2012/05/21/poverty-increa 
sing-among-retirees. 
 13. Studies show that as adults increase in education level, they become less likely to 
reside within proximity to their mothers. Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Proximity 
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numbers of elderly Americans with less family nearby is a situa-
tion ripe for utilization of filial responsibility laws. 
Under Virginia Code section 20-88, joint and several liability 
may be applied to any person of ―sufficient earning capacity or in-
come, after reasonably providing for his or her own immediate 
family, to assist in providing for the support and maintenance of 
his or her [parent, if such parent is] in necessitous circumstanc-
es.‖
14
 Though well-intentioned, this statute carries serious impli-
cations. First, unlike child support laws, where federal law re-
quires enforcement in all fifty states,
15
 it is unclear whether an 
adult child living outside of Virginia would be liable—state courts 
conflict on whether other state filial responsibility laws apply to 
their citizens.
16
 Second, the law‘s language is open to interpreta-
tion, leaving practitioners with little guidance.
17
 Third, with the 
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid in the last century, the 
statute‘s very purpose—to provide a safety net for the aging and 
indigent—no longer carries the same urgency, leaving the statute 
open to exploitation for matters of sibling rivalry or parent-child 
conflicts, rather than providing a social good. For these reasons, 
Virginia should act preemptively to either repeal or amend the 
statute. 
On its face, the Virginia law seems laudable, requiring private 
payment by family members for costs that would otherwise be in-
curred by the state. However, upon closer examination, signifi-
cant issues regarding implementation and fairness arise. The 
Virginia statute has not lain dormant, but rather has been im-
plemented without report.
18
 Other states have recognized the fu-
tility of filial responsibility laws and have preempted such abuse 
 
and Coresidence of Adult Children and Their Parents in the United States: Description and 
Correlates, 1, 8, 13–14 (Inst. for Study of Lab. (12A)), Discussion Paper No. 7431, 2013 
(Ger.).  
 14. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012). 
 16. Compare California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. 1958) (enforcing Califor-
nia filial responsibility statute in Texas), with Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep‘t of Pub. Assis-
tance v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ohio 1954) (not enforcing Pennsylvania law in Ohio). 
 17. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick L. Maurer, supra note 3 (indicating 
difficulty of understanding legal standard when faced with lawsuit pursuant to Virginia 
Code section 20-88); Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5 (explaining 
difficulty of predicting when clients may or may not be liable). 
 18. Most cases are settled out of court or are held in juvenile and domestic relations 
court, one not of record. See Elkins, supra note 11. 
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by repealing their laws.
19
 Virginia should act now to either repeal 
the statute or amend it to ensure its citizens avoid inequitable 
outcomes like the defendant in Pittas. 
This comment discusses the background and development of 
filial responsibility laws in England, the United States, and Vir-
ginia in Part I. Part II explains the purpose behind implementa-
tion of such laws while Part III discusses the problems enforcing 
the filial responsibility law may cause. Lastly, Part IV explains 
why past reasons for keeping the law are no longer valid. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Laws requiring children to provide for their parents are far 
from a recent domestic phenomenon.
20
 American filial responsibil-
ity laws are statutory creations tracing directly back to the Eliza-
bethan Poor Relief Act of 1601, which directed ―the Father and 
Grandfather, and the Mother and Grandmother, and the Chil-
dren of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent Person or other 
poor Person not able to work, being of a sufficient Ability, shall, 
at their own Charges, relieve and maintain every such poor Per-
son.‖
21
 The statute‘s purpose was to relieve the Crown treasury‘s 
burden by imposing financial liability of the poor among private 
persons instead.
22
 The United States inherited these laws during 
the colonial era.
23
 England eventually repealed its filial support 
law because of its impracticality;
24
 however, such laws remained 
on the books in many American states. 
 
 19. Today, twenty-nine states have filial responsibility laws, down from forty-five in 
the 1950s. Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern 
Society?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 195, 196 (1992); see also supra note 2.  
 20. See Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Consid-
erations, J.L. & POL‘Y 709, 710–11 (2001) (referencing how current filial responsibility 
laws are descended from early Roman and Greek law and Judeo-Christian scriptures). 
 21. Poor Relief Act, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, VII (Eng.), http://www.workhouses.org.uk/ 
poorlaws/1601act.shtml. 
 22. Michael Rosenbaum, Are Family Responsibility Laws Constitutional?, 1 FAM. L.Q. 
55, 55 (1967). 
 23. Park, supra note 9, at 444. 
 24. National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 29, (Eng.). A commission con-
ducted to evaluate England‘s filial responsibility laws found them largely impractical be-
cause, among other things, they ―impoverishe[d a] family just when they want[ed] more 
money‖ (when a family member became ill) and caused inequitable results. See POOR LAW 
COMMISSION, NEW POOR LAW OR NO POOR LAW: BEING A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAJORITY & 
MINORITY REPORTS 1, 62, 107 (1909), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104 
276599. 
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In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to create 
Medicare and Medicaid.
25
 Some view the passage of Medicaid as 
abrogating filial responsibility laws.
26
 Congress created Medicaid 
with the legislative purpose to provide for the sick and indigent,
27
 
demonstrating the importance of this public policy. In determin-
ing eligibility under Medicaid, the government can only take into 
account the income and resources of the recipient‘s spouse, not of 
any other family members.
28
 In the 1970s and 1980s, Virginia 
amended its filial responsibility statute, removing liability if the 
parent became eligible for public benefits under Medicaid.
29
 
Virginia is a ―typical‖ example of a filial responsibility law with 
its roots in colonial times.
30
 It was first enacted in 1920 to require 
―able-bodied persons over sixteen . . . to support their parents in 
cities of one hundred thousand inhabitants or more‖ if the parent 
was in destitute or necessitous circumstances.
31
 Since then, the 
General Assembly has expanded and changed its wording; it now 
establishes liability only if the parent is in ―necessitous circum-
stances.‖
32
 Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton defined ―neces-
sitous‖ as ―[l]iving in or characterized by poverty,‖ and deter-
mined it to be a question of fact to be evaluated under the relative 
circumstances.
33
 Since the 1938 holding in Mitchell-Powers 
Hardware v. Eaton, the Virginia legislature has omitted the ―des-
titute‖ requirement in the statute. Thus the standard today is 
 
 25. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012)). 
 26. See Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113, 117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (stating by passing 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D), Congress ―abrogated the legal duty to support one‘s parents‖); 
see also infra Part IV.D (discussing states that have repealed filial responsibility laws 
based on this reasoning). 
 27. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: Advancing the Nation‘s 
Health, 1 PUB. PAPERS 12 (Jan. 7, 1965) (commenting the nation‘s ―oldest tradition‖ was to 
―give ‗an attention to health‘ for all . . . people‖). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (2012); see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
43 (1981) (upholding a regulation permitting determining spousal income in benefits to be 
a reasonable exercise of power). 
 29. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 1975); see Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support 
Laws in the Modern Era: Domestic and International Comparisons of Enforcement Practic-
es for Laws Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 ELDER L.J. 269, 273 
(2013). 
 30. Pearson, supra note 29, at 274. 
 31. VA. CODE, ch. 298 of Acts 1920 (Pollard, 1920). 
 32. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 33. 171 Va. 255, 262–63, 198 S.E. 496, 499–500 (1938). 
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ambiguous; a parent must be somewhat impoverished but not in 
a ―condition of extreme want.‖
34
 
The Virginia statute establishes joint and several liability on 
an adult child if he or she is over eighteen, has sufficient earning 
capacity or income, and only after ―reasonably providing for 
[one‘s] own immediate family.‖
35
 Once liability is established, the 
court ―shall have the power to determine and order the payment‖ 
for ―support and maintenance‖ of the parent and may revise the 
order over time.
36
 ―Support and maintenance‖ means doing ―more 
than reliev[ing] the pangs of hunger,‖ providing enough to ―com-
port with the health, comfort and welfare of normal individuals 
according to their standards of living, considering his or her own 
means, earning capacity, and station in life.‖
37
 The juvenile and 
domestic relations district court (―JDR‖) in which the parent re-
sides has original jurisdiction over cases arising from the stat-
ute.
38
 If a child does not comply with an order pursuant to the 
statute, Virginia may impose criminal liability in the form of a 
misdemeanor, punished by either a fine less than $500 or less 
than twelve months in jail.
39
 Lastly, the statute provides defenses 
to liability: desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure to support 
the child prior to the child‘s emancipation, and where the parent 
is eligible for and already receiving public assistance.
40
 The type 
of conduct that would rise to the level of desertion, neglect, and 
abuse or willful failure to support has yet to be determined in 
Virginia.
41
 
 
 34. Compare Mitchell-Powers Hardware, 171 Va. at 262, 198 S.E. at 499 (defining 
―destitute‖), with Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 534 (1978) (Arlington County) (inter-
preting filial responsibility law that no longer required ―destitution‖ to hold a mother own-
ing some jewelry, oriental rugs, and other property insufficient to outweigh evidence of 
―necessitous circumstances‖). 
 35. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 36. Id. This provision makes Virginia‘s filial support statute unique because it allows 
courts to decide the amount a child is liable for regardless of the initial amount asked for 
by the plaintiff or prosecutor. See Donna Harkness, What Are Families For? Re-evaluating 
Return to Filial Responsibility Laws, 21 ELDER L.J. 305, 322 (2013). 
 37. Mitchell-Powers Hardware, 171 Va. at 262–63, 198 S.E. at 499–500. 
 38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; see also Peyton v. Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. 531, 532–33 (1978) (Arlington County) 
(holding social security does not qualify under this exception). 
 41. States have interpreted similar defenses to filial responsibility laws with very dif-
ferent standards. Compare Pelletier v. White, 371 A.2d 1068, 1069–70 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1976) (claiming father willfully deserted son by failing to pay child support and having 
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Case law interpreting Virginia Code section 20-88 is sparse; its 
last recorded interpretation was in 1978.
42
 This could be for sev-
eral reasons. First, parties must file filial support petitions in 
JDR, a court not of record.
43
 Second, parties tend to settle out of 
court, perhaps due to the personal nature of such cases or the 
parties‘ effort to avoid extra legal costs.
44
 For these same reasons, 
parties are less likely to appeal to state circuit court.
45
 Lastly, the 
statute is usually a tool of last resort, where one child stubbornly 
will not voluntarily provide for a parent—a circumstance that, 
thankfully, is not widespread.
46
 
In general, most Virginia cases implementing section 20-88 
tend to arise out of tangential disputes, not those between the ac-
tual parent and child. Siblings can use the statute to sue each 
other if they believe one is not providing sufficient financial sup-
port for a parent. In one situation, an adult-daughter who was 
providing for her local mother used the statute to make her out-
of-state sister financially liable.
47
 The siblings settled in that case, 
with the defendant sister agreeing to pay a lump sum and half of 
her mother‘s future expenses.
48
 There were two less successful pe-
titions in Southeast Virginia in which adult children used the 
statute to sue a sibling to pay for a parent‘s expenses; the JDR 
judge in both cases deemed the parent was not in ―necessitous 
circumstances,‖ causing the petition to fail.
49
 In Peyton v. Peyton, 
 
little role in his life), with Mitchell v. Pub. Welfare Div., 528 P.2d 1371, 1371–72 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1974) (maintaining no ―abandonment or willful desertion‖ where even though mother 
had no part in raising son physically or financially, she did see him occasionally, buying 
him birthday presents, and her financial struggle was no fault of her own), and Cannon v. 
Juras, 515 P.2d 428, 429–30 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (forcing child to pay for mother because, 
although she stood by and allowed her new husband to expel child from home, she did so 
―unintentionally‖). 
 42. See Peyton, 8 Va. Cir. at 531. 
 43. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016); Elkins, supra note 11. 
 44. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7 (providing example 
of Virginia case ending in settlement). 
 45. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3 (indicating ex-
ample where the plaintiff/mother originally appealed to circuit court, but decided later to 
withdraw the appeal). 
 46. See Elkins, supra note 11 (citing Northern Virginia lawyer Yahne Miorini who ex-
plained, ―adult children who have the resources generally step up if and when they can. If 
they don‘t have the means, there is no reason to file a petition.‖). 
 47. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3; Telephone Interview with 
R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5. 
MACON  511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016 4:09 PM 
272 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:265 
 
the most recently recorded Virginia case using section 20-88, a 
petitioner was successful in bringing an action against a sibling 
to contribute towards the support and care of his mother.
50
 Addi-
tionally, when a parent remarries, disputes between stepparents 
and biological children can arise. This occurred in Virginia Beach 
where a stepfather allegedly used section 20-88 as a sword 
against his stepchildren to pay for their mother‘s costs, rather 
than apply for Medicaid, in retaliation for the children bringing 
an action for guardianship of their mother.
51
 
II.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
A.  Moral Theory 
There is undoubtedly a moral justification for filial responsibil-
ity laws that stems from the Ten Commandments‘ requirement to 
―honor thy mother and father.‖
52
 Some argue filial responsibility 
statutes ―strengthen family bonds‖ because they codify an already 
existing cultural and moral obligation to repay parents for their 
support while instilling the value of caring for elderly parents.
53
 
Others argue it could help incentivize parents to pay greater at-
tention to their budget and save for retirement, knowing if they 
do not, the burden may fall on the children.
54
 Some even argue it 
strengthens sibling bonds because one child may be more apt to 
take affirmative steps to assist a parent knowing he or she may 
eventually be found liable.
55
 
Generally, most Americans voluntarily care for their parents, 
without need of legal action.
56
 Evidence points away from the no-
 
 50. 8 Va. Cir. 531, 532, 534 (1978) (Arlington County) (establishing liability only after 
finding the mother was in ―necessitous circumstances‖ and the child had ―reasonably 
provid[ed] for his . . . own immediate family‖). 
 51. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4. 
 52. See Park, supra note 9, at 451. 
 53. See Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Sup-
port Our Parents Be Effectively Enforced?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 501, 504 (2002); Katie Sisaket, 
Comment, We Wouldn‟t Be Here If It Weren‟t For Them: Encouraging Family Caregiving of 
Indigent Parents, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 69, 88–89 (2015). 
 54. See Park, supra note 9, at 452. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See SUSAN C. REINHARD ET AL., AARP PUB. POL‘Y INST., VALUING THE 
INVALUABLE: 2015 UPDATE 1, 3 (2015), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/2015/val 
uing-the-invaluable-2015-update-new.pdf (generating statistics showing the amount of 
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tion that a filial support law is necessary to incentivize children. 
Any adult child who chooses not to care for aging parents would 
probably not undergo a change of heart solely because of an im-
posed legal obligation. Although perhaps an outlier, in the exam-
ple above where a child sued her distant sister for financial sup-
port, the defendant sister claimed she withheld support for their 
mother to protest her exclusion from the decision-making process 
in her mother‘s living situation.
57
 Although unaware of the details 
of the defendant‘s situation, one could speculate the reason given 
for withholding support was possibly pretextual. The daughter 
who needed help surely would have attempted to provide a carrot 
before resorting to a statutory stick, considering her dire financial 
state. Stubborn siblings do exist, but should be the minority of 
circumstances when those who, having the means to do so, volun-
tarily support their parents. 
Thus, although most would agree supporting a parent in need 
is a rational policy, forcing this obligation upon autonomous 
adults who may have legitimate reasons for turning their backs 
on a parent, may be counterproductive. Such laws could poten-
tially even violate the First Amendment‘s Establishment Clause 
because they entangle religious values with government.
58
 No one 
has yet to challenge a filial support law in court on this theory; 
however, justifying the enforcement of parental liability because 
it is the ―moral‖ thing to do could be interpreted as having an im-
permissible moral purpose (promoting religiously tinged values) 
or excessively entangling the government with religion by making 
the state the enforcer of Judeo-Christian values.
59
 Under this in-
terpretation, filial support laws could violate the Establishment 
Clause, making them unconstitutional. 
 
Americans giving voluntary care to aging parents is on the rise). 
 57. Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7. 
 58. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 326–27 (noting filial responsibility laws‘ historical 
roots in religion and the potential for this to result in a First Amendment violation). 
 59. The Supreme Court interprets the Establishment Clause as requiring a law to: (1) 
have a secular purpose; (2) not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting 
religion; and (3) not fostering ―excessive entanglement‖ of the government with religion. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (violating any of the three requirements 
makes such a law invalid under the First Amendment).  
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B.  Contract Theory 
Some argue parental liability is justified under a contract theo-
ry.
60
 This theory holds that an implicit contract forms between 
parent and child, where in return for raising a son or daughter, 
that child, will care for the parent during old age. To hold other-
wise would allow the child to be ―unjustly enriched.‖
61
 A filial re-
sponsibility statute therefore becomes ―implicit legislative recog-
nition‖ of the child‘s duty to support a parent.
62
 
Opponents of this theory argue implying a contractual obliga-
tion on a minor is unjustified as children do not have the capacity 
to consent.
63
 Even if the contract theory were to hold up, the legal 
obligation to support a child only lasts eighteen years, whereas 
support of a parent is of indefinite duration.
64
 This also contra-
venes the common law principle presuming transfers between 
parents and children as gifts.
65
 Moreover, the quality of a parent‘s 
support varies in every household. In other states, individuals 
who grew up in households with arguably absent parents were 
still held liable under their state‘s filial support statute.
66
 Alt-
hough Virginia provides defenses for children whose parents‘ 
conduct rose to the level of ―desertion, abuse, or willful failure to 
support,‖
67
 it has yet to interpret the extent a parents‘ actions 
must be a bar to liability. 
 
 60. See Park, supra note 9, at 451. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Constitutionality of Statutory Provision Requiring 
Reimbursement by Child for Financial Assistance to Aged Parents, 75 A.L.R.3d 1159 
(1977).  
 63. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 326–27. 
 64. See Edelstone, supra note 53, at 506. 
 65. See, e.g., Brousseau v. Brousseau, 927 A.2d 773, 779 (Vt. 2007) (―[T]he presump-
tion of gifts for transfers between parents and their children, including adult children, is 
well established.‖); Bowen v. Bowen, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (S.C. 2003) (―[T]he presumption 
[where property is conveyed to a spouse or child] is that the purchase was designated as a 
gift or advancement. . . .‖). But see Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 128, 581 S.E.2d 507, 508 
(2003) (not presuming a gift when a parent-child transfer consists of retitling property). 
 66. See, e.g., Cheatham v. Juras, 501 P.2d 988, 989–90 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) (holding 
child must support mother, despite her absence during his childhood, because her mental 
illness causing the ―abandonment‖ was not a volitional act). 
 67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
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C.  Easing Government‟s Medicaid Costs 
The strongest and primary justification for filial responsibility 
laws is to shift the burden of financing the indigent into the pri-
vate sector, the same purpose prompting the English Parliament 
to pass the Elizabethan Poor Relief Act in 1601.
68
 In light of the 
rising costs of Medicaid,
69
 using Virginia Code section 20-88 as an 
alternative may seem to be an appropriate method to trim the 
state‘s budget. It is difficult to ignore the financial stress on gov-
ernment as baby boomers become aged and infirm, while the 
younger generation appears unable to carry these costs.
70
 Alt-
hough no such record of Virginia‘s legislative intent for passing 
section 20-88 exists, based on similar statutes‘ interpretations in 
other jurisdictions, one can assume this to be a primary justifica-
tion.
71
 Some even attribute the rise of government programs aid-
ing the needy as a direct result of failure to implement or enforce 
filial responsibility statutes.
72
 
Others argue that despite having economic justification, in re-
ality, the administrative burden to implement such statutes far 
outweigh the benefit.
73
 Determining, among other things, whether 
a parent is in ―necessitous circumstances,‖ a child has the finan-
cial ability, or whether a parent‘s historic conduct rose to the level 
of ―desertion, neglect, abuse or willful failure to support,‖ is a 
complex factual determination. Determining such elements will 
create an ―administrative nightmare,‖ outweighing any benefit 
the state may devise from the law.
74
 
 
 68. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 55. 
 69. See Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Costs Rise, but Some States Are Spared, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/us/medicaid-costs-rise-report-
says-but-not-more-than-most-states-expected.html?_r=0 (discussing rising costs of Medi-
caid due to its expansion of coverage under the Affordable Care Act). 
 70. See Matthew Pakula, The Legal Responsibility of Adult Children to Care for Indi-
gent Parents, NAT. CTR. FOR POL‘Y ANALYSIS (July 12, 2005), www.ncpa.org/pub/ba521. 
 71. See, e.g., Pickett v. Pickett, 251 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind. App. Ct. 1969) (―We believe 
the intent of the General Assembly . . . was to relieve the general public of liability for 
support of those individuals who have children financially able to contribute to their 
maintenance and support . . .‖). 
 72. See Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to 
Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 FAM. L.Q. 859, 868 (2005). 
 73. The administrative burden filial support laws may cause is discussed infra Part 
III.E. 
 74. See Park, supra note 9, at 456. 
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III.  PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
A.  Contravenes Public Policy 
Few deny that providing a safety net for the old and indigent is 
an important policy the Commonwealth should stand behind. En-
forcing filial support statutes create the effect of greater ―equality 
of treatment among‖ an older generation, but carry the unintend-
ed consequence of unequally burdening their children.
75
 This 
leads to the inquiry of whether it is fair to force children who, 
through no fault of their own, have indigent parents, while those 
with parents who adequately prepared for old age bear no respon-
sibility. This idea may also undermine the traditional public poli-
cy of maximizing individual autonomy.
76
 Historically, the United 
States dislikes impinging on an individuals‘ freedom unless a 
―compelling‖ justification exists for doing so.
77
 Thus, there exists a 
tension between the two policies, retaining individual autonomy 
versus supporting the old and indigent. 
Opponents of filial responsibility have challenged the laws‘ 
constitutionality.
78
 These challenges have been unsuccessful, like-
ly because ―[n]o quasi-suspect classification or fundamental right‖ 
was at stake, leaving courts unable to use a heightened scrutiny 
standard, but rather only evaluate the laws under a ―rational ba-
sis analysis.‖
79
 For example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
believed having an indigent parent was a rational enough reason 
to implement financial liability.
80
 These failed challenges only 
prove that filial responsibility laws will probably withstand most 
constitutional challenges, not that the laws are fair.
81
 
 
 75. W. Walton Garrett, Filial Responsibility Laws, 18 J. FAM. L. 793, 817 (1979). 
 76. See B. GUY PETERS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 470 
(10th ed. 2015). 
 77. Id. at 470–71 (referencing protecting children and the mentally incompetent is 
usually a justifiable ―compelling‖ reason to erode one‘s individual autonomy).  
 78. See, e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 572 (S.D. 1994); 
Swoap v. Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 847 (Ca. 1973); Maricopa Cty. v. Douglas, 208 P.2d 
646, 649 (Ariz. 1949). 
 79. Randall, 513 N.W.2d at 572. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Constitutional violations are evaluated on a higher standard than simple fairness. 
For example, to argue a successful due process violation under the United States Constitu-
tion, one must argue the state actor‘s culpability to be at least intentional. See Cty. of Sac-
ramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848–49 (1998) (noting the ―Constitution does not guaran-
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Unlike in the seventeenth century, when England first enacted 
its filial responsibility law, or in 1920 when Virginia enacted its 
own, it is no longer the trend for families to live in close proximity 
to each other.
82
 Virginia Code section 20-88 is more sensible when 
applied to a community where children stay in the same locality 
as parents. Unlike the more agrarian society of the past, mem-
bers of the millennial generation are less inclined to remain in 
the community in which they grew up.
83
 In this modern society, 
filial responsibility laws tend to apply inequitably to the poor and 
less-educated who lack the means to move around.
84
 Previously, 
society deemed it important for children to support parents into 
old age.
85
 Today, our social norms may have shifted.
86
 
Some argue filial responsibility laws actually break down fami-
ly relationships, not promote them.
87
 This is because the laws only 
require financial support, not the physical or emotional support 
that typically comes with voluntary care.
88
 The federal govern-
ment adopted this view when creating Medicare and Medicaid.
89
 
Where no voluntary care of a parent exists, there is likely a 
strained parent-child relationship; that tension becomes exacer-
bated when a child is forced de jure to support a parent. Such re-
 
tee due care on the part of state officials‖ but requires a higher threshold of liability).  
 82. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 66. 
 83. See Millennials Continue Urbanization Leaving Small Towns, NPR (Oct. 21, 2014, 
6:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/21/357723069/millennials-continue-urbanization-of-
america-leaving-small-towns (discussing large growth of educated millennials moving 
away from small towns to big metropolitan areas); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 
66 (―Where formerly parents and children were apt to share a house or farm, today the 
trend is to establish independent households instead of sharing homes with relatives.‖). 
 84. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 66 (noting how ―responsibility laws tend to 
make the poor or the near-poor live together rather than establish independent house-
holds‖ like their wealthier peers). 
 85. History and American Studies Professor Hendrik Hartog at Princeton explains 
how nineteenth-century parents were reliant on children for care, forcing them to promise 
an  inheritance  in  return. See  Stephen  J.  Dubner,  Should  Kids  Pay  Back  Their  Par-
ents for Raising Them?, FREAKONOMICS (Oct. 8, 2015,  10:16  AM), http://freakonomics. 
com/podcast/should-kids-pay-back-their-parents-for-raising-them-a-new-freakonomics-rad 
io-episode/.  
 86. See id. (noting how parents are no longer as dependent on adult children today 
due to the rise of private pensions and Social Security). 
 87. Park, supra note 9, at 454–55. 
 88. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 344 (―[F]ilial responsibility laws do not address 
the fundamental need that all persons, and most especially the vulnerable elderly, have to 
be supported by caring relationships.‖) (emphasis added). 
 89. See S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2018 (―Be-
yond [parents being accountable to children, familial] requirements imposed are often de-
structive and harmful to the relationships among members of the family group.‖). 
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sentment may be more likely to damage a family relationship ra-
ther than heal what was already broken. 
Filial responsibility laws may be rarely enforced due to the un-
ease many feel about using legal recourse as an appropriate rem-
edy.
90
 Some states, such as Virginia, permit government officials 
to prosecute individuals who fail to pay funds under filial respon-
sibility statutes.
91
 Americans tend to believe there are more im-
portant duties for prosecutors besides ―forcing people to support 
their aged relatives against their will.‖
92
 Virginia‘s implementa-
tion of section 20-88 so far has only involved private actions; 
there are no recorded cases of the Commonwealth suing an adult-
child on behalf of an agency. One could speculate that the unwill-
ingness of the Commonwealth to enforce a law may be due to its 
misalignment with general public policy concerns.
93
 
B.  Lack of Uniformity 
The lack of uniformity regarding codified filial responsibility 
across the country makes it inherently unfair and difficult to im-
plement. Regulating the family is an area of law typically dele-
gated to the states.
94
 The obligation to support a parent is statu-
torily created;
95
 thus, states vary widely on whether they require 
parental support, and if they do, what that encompasses.
96
 Stay-
 
 90. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 61–62 (citing FLOYD A. BOND ET AL., OUR 
NEEDY AGED: A CALIFORNIA STUDY OF A NATIONAL PROBLEM 200 (1954)). 
 91. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (―A proceeding may be instituted . . . in 
the name of the Commonwealth by the state agency administering the program of assis-
tance or services in order to compel any child of a parent receiving such assistance or ser-
vices to reimburse the Commonwealth.‖). 
 92. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
BOND ET AL., supra note 90, at 200). 
 93. Enforcement would probably come from the Office of the Attorney General, who 
may be reluctant to enforce such laws for political reasons. See id. (noting the reason for 
infrequent court decisions is the reluctance of elected officials to force people to support 
relatives against their will). 
 94. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (rejecting the government‘s 
―national productivity‖ reasoning out of concern that allowing ―Congress [to] regulate any 
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens [could 
lead to its regulation of] family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody),‖ an 
area of law usually regulated by the states). 
 95. Pearson, supra note 29, at 278 (citing Dawson v. Dawson, 12 Iowa 512, 514 (1861)) 
(distinguishing the common law duty of a parent to support offspring from the statutorily 
created duty of a child to support parents). 
 96. See id. at 304 (providing table of fifty states including whether the state contains a 
MACON  511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016 4:09 PM 
2016] GROW UP VIRGINIA 279 
 
ing in the same state as one‘s parents is no longer the norm as 
Americans have become ―highly mobile and increasingly transi-
ent.‖
97
 The Supreme Court of Virginia has yet to speak to whether 
section 20-88 applies to non-Virginians. Meanwhile, other states 
have ruled differently on whether sister states‘ filial responsibil-
ity laws are applicable to their own residents.
98
 It is unclear 
whether Virginia courts have jurisdiction over non-resident chil-
dren in the increasingly common situation where children reside 
in different states. 
Until 1992, state child support laws experienced the same is-
sue.
99
 It was only federal intervention that allowed state child 
support obligations to become uniformly enforced in all fifty 
states.
100
 The Child Support Recovery Act (―CSRA‖) was passed to 
stabilize ―the economic security of children of divorced parents‖
101
 
by holding such ―deadbeat parents‖ accountable.
102
 Although child 
support is a family law issue, members of Congress characterized 
the law in terms of economics. Senator D‘Amato noted how CSRA 
aimed to ―secure [the country‘s] economic foundation‖: its chil-
dren.
103
 Senator Schumer prefaced the bill as not purporting to 
satisfy a moral obligation, but rather to stop American children 
and taxpayers from being ―robbed.‖
104
 At the state level, child 
support laws and filial support laws serve the same purpose: both 
 
filial support law and if so, the case law interpreting it). 
 97. Harkness, supra note 36, at 316–17. 
 98. Compare California v. Copus, 309 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Tex. 1958) (enforcing Califor-
nia filial responsibility law in Texas), with Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep‘t of Pub. Assistance v. 
Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33–34 (not enforcing Pennsylvania law where it conflicted with Ohio 
statute). 
 99. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S7236 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
D‘Amato) (noting the ―tragic practice of delinquency‖ when fathers flee to another state to 
avoid paying child support); Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in 
Child Support: Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 
102nd Cong. 28 (1992) (statement of Harry W. Wiggins, Dir., Va. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. Div. 
of Child Support Enf‘t) (―States are unable to effectively work together due to widely dif-
fering State regulations and laws.‖). 
 100. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012). 
 101. 138 CONG. REC. S16449 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. D‘Amato). 
 102. Statement on Signing the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 2122 (Oct. 25, 1992). 
 103. 137 CONG. REC. S7236-37 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. D‘Amato). 
 104. Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support: 
Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102nd Cong. 
1–2 (1992) (―[P]eople who have good families, together families, nothing to do with child 
support themselves, are directly affected, because the taxpayer is robbed of billions of dol-
lars when the children‘s mothers can‘t make ends meet and are forced to rely on welfare.‖). 
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enforce a financial obligation on a private person rather than on 
the state. 
The federal government might find difficulty passing a law 
similar to CSRA to enforce other states‘ filial support laws. Our 
culture tends to view ―deadbeat parents‖ who escape child sup-
port obligations as ―culpable‖ and the children to whom money is 
owed as blameless.
105
 In contrast, characterizing adult children 
who escape liability for parents as ―deadbeats‖ seems odd and un-
justified,
106
 especially if they have endured a strained emotional 
parent-child relationship. Further, unlike the child support sce-
nario, in many cases, the parent seeking support from the child 
may be to blame for his or her financial shortcomings,
107
 differing 
greatly from the innocent child who is, by definition, completely 
dependent upon his parents. The basis for protecting our chil-
dren, something most Americans agree on, does not smoothly ex-
tend into an artificial scheme for parental support. 
States could potentially fix the enforcement problem without 
the federal government‘s aid. The National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform In-
terstate Family Support Act (―UIFSA‖), which Virginia, along 
with its forty-nine sister states, adopted in 1994.
108
 Thus, if 
UIFSA were amended to extend beyond child support to include 
any type of family support, this inequity could be remedied. 
Again, however, such a move is unlikely, as UIFSA is based upon 
the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, which 
limits its application to child and spousal support.
109
 Independent-
 
 105. See id. at 2. 
 106. See supra Part III.A. 
 107. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2012) (mother fled nursing home bill to move to Greece); Amber Spataro, “Prodi-
gal Parent” as a Defense to Proceedings Brought To Require Support from a Child, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 385 (2000) (providing the example of Hal and Wanda, who 
retired at sixty-five and spent frivolously, leading them to sue their children for support 
ten years later). 
 108. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM‘N 2008) (explaining 
that all states adopted UIFSA); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW 
COMM‘N 1992) (changing name from Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement Act); Lawrence D. 
Diehl, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act: A Practical Update, VA. LAW., Feb. 2001, at 
24, http://www.vsb.org/docs/valawyermagazine/feb01diehl.pdf (discussing Virginia‘s codifi-
cation of UIFSA).   
 109. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the International 
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, Art. 2 (Nov. 23, 2007), 
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ly amending UIFSA to include parental support is unlikely for 
the same reasons Congress has not extended CSRA to parental 
support. The public outcry to care for children is just not the 
same when it comes to aging parents. Even if UIFSA were 
amended to include parental support, it would not ameliorate the 
issue of consistency. One of the issues prompting CSRA‘s passage 
was the Uniform Reciprocal Act‘s inability to make child support 
enforcement uniform.
110
 
C.  Constitutional Concerns 
As discussed above, despite the inequities filial support laws 
may impose, such laws have generally survived constitutional 
challenges.
111
 Virginia‘s filial responsibility law, however, may vi-
olate the U.S. Constitution as applied. Among the various plain-
tiffs who have challenged filial responsibility laws in other 
states,
112
 some have argued such laws violate individuals‘ due pro-
cess rights, both substantive and procedural.
113
 Others have ar-
gued the laws violate the Equal Protection Clause on various 
grounds.
114
 These challenges have largely been denied because 
 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/14e71887-0090-47a3-9c49-d438eb601b47.pdf. 
 110. See Criminal Penalty for Flight to Avoid Payment of Arrearages in Child Support: 
Hearing on H.R. 1241 Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102nd Cong. 
29 (1992). 
 111. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
112. See, e.g., Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 572 (S.D. 1994); 
Swoap v. Super. Ct., 516 P.2d 840, 847 (Cal. 1973); Pennsylvania ex rel. Dep‘t of Pub. As-
sistance v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33–34 (Ohio 1954); Maricopa Cty. v. Douglas, 208 P.2d 
646, 649 (Ariz. 1949); Morris Cty. Welfare Bd. v. Gilligan, 31 A.2d 805, 806 (N.J. 1943).  
 113. Courts have largely upheld such laws. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 128 N.E.2d 3, 7 
(Ohio 1955) (explaining the law‘s rational ―purpose . . . is to create, as between parents 
and adult children, a legal obligation which previously was only a moral one resting upon 
close blood relationships and humanitarian considerations.‖). But see Gilligan, 31 A.2d at 
806 (upholding challenge to procedural due process where notice was not required by the 
statute). 
 114. Such Equal Protection challenges include arguments that filial support laws une-
qually burden children of the indigent by ―double taxing‖ them, claiming defendants paid 
taxes to provide for other aged individuals plus their own, see Douglas, 208 P.2d at 649, 
and also by irrationally basing liability on involuntary biological relationships, see Swoap, 
516 P.2d at 851. State courts found both reasons to survive a rational basis test. In Swoap, 
the court also struck the plaintiffs‘ challenge to California‘s law based on impermissible 
classification by wealth. Id. at 850 (noting the law draws no distinction among wealthy 
versus poor children). While Virginia Code section 20-88 does draw a line based on wealth 
by determining whether the child is ―of sufficient earning capacity‖ before establishing 
liability, classification based on wealth should still survive the ―rational basis‖ test. See 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (―[A]t least where wealth 
is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely 
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courts tend to reason such laws have a rational basis. However, 
there are no known Equal Protection claims arguing that a filial 
responsibility law irrationally places a burden on one child in one 
state but not a sibling residing in another state. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held Pennsylvania‘s filial responsibil-
ity law, as applied to an Ohio resident, violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause due to differences in state law.
115
 In Mong, an Ohio 
resident was sued under Pennsylvania‘s filial responsibility law— 
which, unlike the Ohio version, did not include the defense of 
abandonment.
116
 The court deemed it unconstitutionally unequal 
to hold the defendant liable under the Pennsylvania law but not 
under Ohio law, where his evidence of abandonment would have 
likely permitted an escape from liability.
117
 Mong demonstrates 
how a potential challenge to Virginia Code section 20-88 based on 
classifying persons by residency—in-state siblings being liable 
versus out-of-state siblings not being liable—may hold sway in 
court. Virginia‘s law provides joint and several liability; this 
leaves the possibility of requiring 100 percent of the financial 
burden to fall on the in-state child, while his or her sibling living 
outside the Commonwealth pays nothing. 
D.  Conflicts with Federal Law 
All Americans aged sixty-five and over are eligible for Medi-
care, a federal government program paying for certain medical 
expenses.
118
 Medicaid, in contrast, is a program implemented 
through the state with aid from the federal government; it covers 
citizens based on need rather than age.
119
 
The 1965 Social Security Act Amendments, which established 
Medicare and Medicaid, limit the scope of the Commonwealth‘s 
filial responsibility law so that it will likely only apply to a par-
ent‘s non-medical expenses. This is because Virginia must comply 
with federal rules to qualify for federal Medicaid funding which, 
 
equal advantages.‖). 
 115. Mong, 117 N.E.2d at 33–34. 
 116. Id. at 33. 
 117. Id. at 33–34. 
 118. Medicare and Medicaid, U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www. 
hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid (last visited Oct. 4, 2016).   
 119. Id. 
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expressly prohibit taking into account the applicant‘s relatives‘ 
(except for the spouse) financial means to determine eligibility.
120
 
Congress created this exemption out of concern that taking non-
spousal relatives into account would be ―destructive and harmful 
to the relationships among members of the family group.‖
121
 
Virginia Code section 20-88 will only apply to a person in ―ne-
cessitous circumstances.‖
122
 Although the standard put forth by 
Mitchell-Powers Hardware Co. v. Eaton has not been tested since 
1938, under that precedent, Virginia interprets the element to 
mean a child is only liable where the parent is ―living in or char-
acterized by poverty.‖
123
 It would therefore be unlikely for one to 
qualify under section 20-88 but not qualify under Medicaid. For 
these reasons, where a parent is in ―necessitous circumstances,‖ 
he or she would likely apply for Medicaid coverage rather than 
turn to litigation against a child. So in reality, under the 1965 
Medicaid Social Security Act Amendments, Virginia‘s filial re-
sponsibility law should only cover non-medical expenses. A par-
ent could qualify for Medicaid and attempt to use the statute to 
require a child to pay for non-Medicaid-covered expenses—
perhaps an arguably nicer nursing home than one accepting Med-
icaid payment—however, such a scenario would probably not sat-
isfy the ―necessitous circumstances‖ element.
124
 
Virginia allows a state agency providing assistance or services 
to sue the parent‘s child for reimbursement under Virginia Code 
section 20-88.
125
 Most case law involving various filial responsibil-
ity statutes arise from a parent being unable to pay the bill for 
 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2012) (prohibiting states from ―tak[ing] into account the 
financial responsibility of any individual for any applicant . . . unless . . . such individual‘s 
spouse or such individual‘s child who is under age 21 or . . . is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled‖); 42 C.F.R. § 435.602(a)(1) (2015) (―Except for a spouse . . . or . . . a child 
who is under age 21 or blind or disabled, the agency must not consider income and re-
sources of any relative as available to an individual.‖) (emphasis added). 
 121. S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2018. 
 122. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 123. 171 Va. 255, 262–63, 198 S.E. 496, 499.  
 124. A Newport News JDR judge ruled this way when he held the parent was not in 
―necessitous circumstances‖ since she was able to be in a nicer assisted living facility; 
thus, section 20-88 was inapplicable. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra 
note 5.  
 125. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). It also provides that if the parent is insti-
tutionalized, the children cannot be liable for more than sixty months of institutionaliza-
tion. Id. 
MACON  511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016 4:09 PM 
284 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:265 
 
the nursing home or medical care center.
126
 Nursing homes are a 
recent phenomenon, only coming about in the twentieth century 
and becoming even more popular after the 1965 passage of Medi-
care and Medicaid.
127
 Providing care for the elderly today often 
comes in the form of nursing home expenses, if not hospital ex-
penses.
128
 The rising cost of nursing homes, which include medical 
expenses,
129
 have exacerbated the growing issue of the elderly‘s 
quickening depletion of funds.
130
 It follows that Virginia‘s filial 
support law typically comes into play when dealing with a par-
ent‘s medical or health-related expenses, especially nursing 
homes.
131
 This creates a conundrum: the elderly need the most fi-
nancial support with regard to medical expenses, but section 20-
88 covers the same medical expenses as Medicaid. 
Not only does federal law prohibit taking into account adult 
children‘s finances when determining Medicaid eligibility, it also 
expressly prohibits nursing homes funded by Medicaid or Medi-
care from requiring a third party to guarantee payment as a con-
dition of admission.
132
 The Department of Health and Human 
Services interpreted this requirement as not allowing any person, 
even one with legal access to the resident‘s income, to be held 
personally financially liable.
133
 This federal regulation should bar 
any claim by a nursing home certified by Medicare or Medicaid 
against a private person under section 20-88. Thus, combined 
 
126. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2012) (nursing home sued son to pay for mother‘s expenses); Prairie Lakes Heath 
Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D. 1998) (hospital sued son to pay for 
the parents‘ medical expenses); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1147 
(R.I. 1994) (Medical Center suing daughter for parents‘ medical expenses).  
 127. The History of Nursing Homes, FATE: FOUNDATION AIDING THE ELDERLY, www. 
4fate.org/history.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 128. See id. 
 129. Federal law defines a ―nursing facility‖ as one that primarily provides ―health-
related care and services.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1) (2012). 
 130. See Brandon, supra note 12. 
 131. All Virginia attorneys interviewed about their experiences with section 20-88 
spoke about situations involving children paying for parents‘ medical expenses. See Tele-
phone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4; Telephone Interview with R. Shawn 
Majette, supra note 5; Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3; Telephone 
Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7. 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 133. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(2) (2015) (permitting ―an individual who has legal access to a 
resident‘s income. . .to provide facility payment from the resident‘s income or resources‖ 
but not allowing the institution to hold her personally financially liable). The author 
thanks Kathy Pryor for pointing out this conflict. Telephone interview with Kathy Pryor, 
supra note 7. 
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with the federal prohibition against evaluating an adult child‘s 
income in deciding Medicaid eligibility, Virginia‘s filial responsi-
bility statute becomes effectively useless. 
E.  Administrative Nightmare 
Virginia Code section 20-88 imposes liability on a case-by-case 
basis. Among other things, a court must determine whether the 
parent is truly in ―necessitous circumstances,‖ the child has ―suf-
ficient earning capacity or income,‖ and—if a defense should ap-
ply—whether ―there is substantial evidence of desertion, neglect, 
abuse, or willful failure to support.‖
134
 This indicates that parties 
must spend time and money gathering evidence to support their 
positions to sway a fact-finder. Some argue these reasons make 
enforcing filial responsibility essentially an ―administrative 
nightmare.‖
135
 This is because enforcement of the law could cost 
the government more money to implement than it would save the 
government overall.
136
 Although California repealed its filial re-
sponsibility statute in 1975,
137
 its original law contained a formula 
to determine the amount of money a child would provide a parent, 
depending on the adult-child‘s income level, and gave a state 
agency the power to make the determination.
138
 A 1950s Califor-
nia survey concluded that most welfare agencies found imple-
menting its filial responsibility law cost them more than the law 
saved them.
139
 
Currently, Virginia Code section 20-88 does not allocate re-
sponsibility to a specific agency to determine liability but leaves it 
to the courts.
140
 Similar to the Department of Medical Assistance 
 
 134. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 135. See, e.g., Park, supra note 9, at 456. 
 136. Id.; see, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 59 (―Since the major policy considera-
tion behind the relative responsibility laws is to guard the public purse, the policy would 
be seriously undermined if, in fact, the administrative costs of collecting money from the 
legally responsible family outweighed the monies saved by the state in the form of lower 
welfare payments.‖). 
 137. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12350 (West 2016); see 22 CAL. L. REV. COMM. 
REPORTS 1 (1992) (noting section 12350 substituted the former Civil Code section 206 
which provided filial liability). 
 138. Robin M. Jacobson, Americana Healthcare Ctr. v. Randall: The Renaissance of Fil-
ial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. REV. 518, 540 n.230–31 (1995) (citing Swoap v. Superior 
Court, 516 P.2d 840, 842 n.3 (Ca. 1973)). 
 139. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 59. 
 140. Virginia Code section 20-88 gives state agencies the right to file suit under the 
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Services‘s (―DMAS‖) ability to examine whether a person is quali-
fied to receive Medicaid,
141
 the Commonwealth could delegate this 
complex fact-finding mission to a specific Virginia agency rather 
than clogging up the courts. 
In 1983, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
142
 
estimated enforcing state filial responsibility laws would reduce 
Medicaid spending by about twenty-five million dollars.
143
 This es-
timate proved untrue after Idaho conducted a program in 1984 to 
enforce its filial support laws, raising only about $32,000 instead 
of the expected $1.5 million.
144
 The Idaho study may not equally 
translate elsewhere, but it does note the limited impact such laws 
may have. Even if the 1983 estimation was accurate, providing 
for inflation,
145
 the amount filial responsibility statutes could save 
still would not substantially reduce Medicaid costs.
146
 
Some argue longer life-spans and population growth have led 
to Medicaid spending becoming too high to remain sustainable.
147
 
Yet, effective implementation of Virginia Code section 20-88 
would likely not even offset nursing home costs,
148
 leaving the po-
tential reduction to Medicaid insignificant. As Northern Virginia 
attorney Yahne Miorini noted, the cost of healthcare today is so 
high that an adult child‘s contribution, which would certainly be 
in a similar range as child support, would be ―just a drop in the 
bucket.‖
149
 
 
statute, but determining applicability of the statute is one for judicial determination. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016). 
 141. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-324.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 142. The  HCFA  was  created  in  1977  for  the  purpose  of  providing  oversight  of 
Medicare and the federal portion of Medicaid. Health Care Finance Administration, 
FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/health-care-finance-admini 
stration (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 143. See Pakula, supra note 70. 
 144. Kline, supra note 19, at 204 (citing ALICE M. RIVLIN & JOSHUA M. WIENER, 
CARING FOR THE DISABLED ELDERLY: WHO WILL PAY? 173 (1988)). 
 145. The $25,000,000 estimated in 1983 would amount to about $60,000,000 today. See 
The Inflation Calculator, WESTEGG, http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Oct. 4, 
2016). 
 146. In 2015, the budget for Medicaid amounted to about $331.4 billion. HHS FY2015 
Budget in Brief, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2015/budget-in-brief/cms/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2016). 
 147. See Sisaket, supra note 53, at 83.  
 148. See supra Part III.D. 
 149. Telephone Interview with Yahne Miorini, Attorney, Miorini Law, PLLC (Apr. 5, 
2016). 
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F.  Potential for Abuse 
Of course, if a person never applies for Medicaid, the federal 
rule precluding evaluation of a family‘s finances does not exist. 
On one hand, this means there are circumstances where Virginia 
Code section 20-88 is useful; on the other hand, this indicates po-
tential abuse of the statute. Virginia‘s filial responsibility only ex-
tends to where the parent is in ―necessitous circumstances.‖ 
There are few circumstances in which one might be deemed in 
―necessitous circumstances‖ yet not qualify for Medicaid.
150
 It fol-
lows that Virginia Code section 20-88, except for unusual circum-
stances,
151
 should only be utilized where the parent needs funds 
for non-medical purposes such as food and shelter. If a parent 
could otherwise qualify for Medicaid, he or she may be using the 
statute for a non-meritorious purpose. 
Recent Virginia cases indicate that Virginia Code section 20-88 
has been used more as a weapon of intra-family rivalries than for 
meritorious purposes. In a Virginia Beach case, the children of a 
woman suffering from dementia attempted to establish guardian-
ship of their mother. However, their stepfather objected and in-
sisted on keeping her at an assisted living facility, despite the 
substantial drain on her assets.
152
 The woman‘s children, as well 
as her guardian ad litem, had recommended applying for Medi-
caid relief and transferring her to a Medicaid-funded, skilled 
nursing facility that would better fit her needs. However, the 
stepfather disagreed.
153
 In retaliation, he filed suit against the 
children under section 20-88.
154
 The JDR judge ordered the chil-
dren to pay the assisted living facility bills.
155
 Before reaching the 
merits on appeal, the Circuit Court judge ordered the stepfather 
 
 150. See supra note 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing today‘s ambiguous 
standard for ―necessitous circumstances‖). 
 151. There are situations where a person qualifies for Medicaid and a parent‘s ―necessi-
tous circumstances‖ include expenses that Medicaid would not cover. In attorney Kathy 
Pryor‘s case, her client‘s ninety-seven-year-old mother spoke little English and had severe 
dementia, causing her to incessantly scream. The nursing home discharged her because 
they could not comply with her needs, forcing the client and her husband to physically and 
financially care for their mother, beyond the hours of care provided by Medicaid. Tele-
phone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7.  
 152. Telephone Interview with Clay L. Macon, supra note 4. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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to apply for Medicaid benefits using the necessary documenta-
tion, and the application was approved.
156
 The mother was then 
transferred to the Medicaid-funded nursing facility, as requested 
by the children and over the objection of the stepfather, with no 
additional expenses accruing to the children or stepfather once 
the transfer took place.
157
 Because the mother‘s future costs were 
no longer an issue that needed to be litigated—as the payment of 
her living expenses had been resolved through the intervention of 
Medicaid—the parties settled, but not without incurring substan-
tial legal fees.
159
  
Another case arising out of Southeastern Virginia involved a 
mother who could no longer pay her nursing home fees.
160
 Her 
daughter, the defendant, had been physically caring for her over 
the past ten years while her son, a Charlottesville lawyer, had 
been in charge of her finances.
161
 After allegedly misappropriating 
her funds, the brother sued himself and his sister on the mother‘s 
behalf.
162
 The daughter was not held liable because the mother 
was not in ―necessitous circumstances,‖ as she had sufficient So-
cial Security and military retirement funds left by her late hus-
band.
163
 Still, the daughter incurred substantial legal fees.
164
 
A Newport News man with a substantial income also used sec-
tion 20-88 to sue his brother, an auto mechanic, because he be-
came tired of carrying a heavier burden in paying the parent‘s as-
sisted living facility bill.
165
 The defendant argued the parent was 
not in ―necessitous circumstances,‖ as evidenced by the nice facili-
ty in which she lived.
166
 The JDR judge agreed and dismissed the 
suit.
167
 
In all of these cases, one private person was using the statute 
to obtain money from another private person, who did not cause 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (estimating he spent around twenty to thirty hours researching this case due 
to the novel issues presented and lack of clear precedent). 
 165. Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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the financial need in the first place. However, other states such 
as Pennsylvania and South Dakota have used their filial respon-
sibility statutes to allow nursing homes to recover funds from pri-
vate persons.
168
 Virginia Poverty Law Center attorney Kathy 
Pryor noted her concern that this would start to happen in Vir-
ginia.
169
 She also expressed concern about the effect this would 
have on those who cannot afford a lawyer and choose to represent 
themselves pro se, without awareness of legal defenses available 
to them.
170
 Because judges seem equally unaware of section 20-
88,
171
 such individuals would likely lack a competent defense and 
be vulnerable to liability for large nursing home debt. In most 
cases where a strong family relationship exists, children who can 
afford to provide for their parents will do so voluntarily.
172
 But 
under the present statutory scheme, there are few mechanisms in 
place to stop private parties from using the law as a sword for 
vengeful purposes. 
IV.   WHY VIRGINIA CODE SECTION 20-88 MUST BE REPEALED OR 
AMENDED 
While filial responsibility laws have various justifications,
173
 
none of them appear sufficient to overcome the unequal treat-
ment they can produce. The strongest incentive for keeping Vir-
ginia Code section 20-88 is the burden pressed upon the state if 
there is no private payment. The policy of using de jure filial sup-
port as a mechanism to save taxpayer dollars, while valid in theo-
ry, is no longer practical, as it is outweighed by the public policies 
of maximizing individual autonomy, equal treatment, and avoid-
ing potential abuse.
174
 
 
 168. See Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012); Prairie Lakes Health Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D. 
1998). 
 169. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7. She further noted how allow-
ing nursing homes to sue private individuals using state filial responsibility statues con-
flicts with federal law regulating Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing facilities. Id.; 
see also supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 170. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 7. 
 171. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3.  
 172. See Elkins, supra note 11. 
 173. See supra Part II. 
 174. See supra Part III. 
MACON  511.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/12/2016 4:09 PM 
290 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:265 
 
A.  Section 20-88 Can Only Be Justified as a Tool to Ease 
Government Costs 
The purposes for filial support laws, beyond saving taxpayer 
money, are limited at best. Virginia cannot justify imposing a le-
gal obligation on adult children to support parents based on an 
implicit contract created in exchange for their parents‘ support 
during their minority years. Courts are reluctant to uphold an 
implicit parent-child contract because they see it as more of a 
moral obligation.
175
 Minors may contract for certain necessities 
such as food and education in Virginia,
176
 however this concept 
has yet to be, nor should be, applied to an implicit contract with a 
parent. 
Few would argue society has abandoned the moral duty to sup-
port one‘s parents. Yet, moral obligations do not always, and 
should not always, become per se legal obligations. The Supreme 
Court confirmed this policy in Lawrence v. Texas, where it found 
preserving an individual‘s right to privacy outweighed a legisla-
ture‘s moral viewpoint; the Court explained, ―the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particu-
lar practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice.‖
177
  
Of course, one may argue that child support enforcement laws 
evoke a similar moral duty to care for those who cannot care for 
themselves. But, the protected group, minor children, differs 
greatly from older adults. The obligation to all children by society 
is different than the obligation of society to older adults, with 
varying income, assets, health, and relations with their chil-
dren.
178
 American society also views those evading child support 
 
 175. See, e.g., Graham v. Morrison, 607 S.E.2d 295, 300 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (―Past 
consideration or moral obligation is not adequate consideration to support a contract.‖); 
Jacobs v. Church, 36 Va. Cir. 277, 279 (1995) (Spotsylvania County) (―It is settled that in 
the absence of an express contract a child cannot recover for services rendered a parent, 
the presumption being that such services were performed in recognition of a filial duty.‖). 
 176. See Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 608, 561 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2002) (upholding a 
contract entered by a minor where it is ―within the general class of necessities‖). 
 177. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (referring to an unconstitutional 
Texas statute that criminalized two persons of the same sex consensually engaging in sex 
in their home).  
 178. See Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2012) (reinforcing sup-
port for all children). 
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as impinging on America‘s ―economic foundation,‖ viewing chil-
dren as the building blocks of the future.
179
  
Even if the duty to support one‘s parents is a worthy goal, it is 
in direct conflict with an even more important public policy: pro-
tecting individual autonomy.
180
 American social norms have shift-
ed since the Elizabethan era when the filial responsibility laws 
were first enacted. Many view forcing children to support their 
parents as antiquated, from a past era when children lived in the 
same household as their parents through adulthood.
181
  
Finally, even if the moral purpose to care for the indigent and 
elderly were sufficient to create a legal obligation, the United 
States has usurped that purpose through the creation of Medicare 
and Medicaid.
182
 The government could never rely solely on filial 
responsibility statutes to provide for the elderly because they are 
under-inclusive: such laws do not provide for those with no chil-
dren, those with children who have predeceased them, or those 
whose children are indigent.
183
 Medicaid and Medicare have be-
come fixtures in American society, creating a safety net for all 
Americans who cannot afford to take care of themselves. 
Because easing the financial burden of the state remains the 
sole valid justification behind parental support statutes, only this 
reason should be weighed against the countervailing policies. 
B.  Section 20-88 No Longer Works in Practice 
The next inquiry becomes whether Virginia should enforce sec-
tion 20-88 to lessen the burden on the state‘s expenditure of Med-
icaid. For Medicaid and Filial Responsibility laws to truly work in 
harmony, DMAS would have to take into account whether the fil-
ial responsibility statute applies when determining Medicaid eli-
gibility. This would entail analyzing the adult child‘s earnings 
and the personal history of the parent-child relationship.
184
 The 
 
 179. See 137 CONG. REC. S7236-04 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. D‘Amato). 
 180. Cf. Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 42, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2005) (finding Virginia 
fornication statute failed rational basis test because an ―intrusion upon a person‘s liberty 
interest‖ outweighed the moral purpose proffered by the government). 
 181. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 66. 
 182. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Harkness, supra note 36, at 328. 
 184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (enforcing only where the child has 
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first problem this poses relates to a federal statute prohibiting 
DMAS from taking into account a child‘s income.
185
 Thus, success-
ful implementation would require amending the federal statute. 
As noted previously, Congress is unlikely to tackle such a political 
bombshell.
186
 Second, the administrative cost for DMAS to deter-
mine whether the statutory defenses apply would be exorbitant.
187
 
DMAS would have to pry into the personal family histories of its 
applicants, adding to the already burdensome amount of time and 
money required to obtain coverage. 
Some argue Medicaid should take into account the finances of 
an applicant‘s children, as many recipients hide their assets 
through inter vivos trusts, making them eligible for Medicaid, 
when in reality they have sheltered assets for their children.
188
 
While this is a strong argument to permit evaluating children‘s 
assets, the federal government deems protecting the family rela-
tionship to be more important.
189
 So unless the federal govern-
ment changes its Medicaid compliance requirements, Virginia can 
do nothing to close that loophole. 
Even in situations in which a person is on Medicaid, yet re-
mains in ―necessitous circumstances,‖
190
 federal law still prohibits 
nursing homes certified by Medicare or Medicaid to hold a third 
party personally financially liable.
191
 Ironically, one of the main 
reasons the elderly become impoverished is the tremendous cost 
of healthcare incurred due to aging.
192
 Unfortunately, save a few 
circumstances, federal law prohibits Virginia Code section 20-88 
from resolving this issue. 
 
―sufficient earning capacity or income‖ and providing defenses of ―desertion, neglect, abuse 
or willful failure to support‖). 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) (2012). 
 186. See supra Part III.B (discussing why the federal government is unlikely to pass a 
law enforcing filial support that is akin to CSRA). 
 187. See supra Part III.E. 
 188. See Matthew Pakula, The Legal Responsibility of Adult Children to Care for Indi-
gent Parents, NAT. CTR. FOR POL‘Y ANALYSIS (July 12, 2005), www.ncpa.org/pub/ba521. 
 189. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 190. This was the case in which the petitioner‘s mother was on Medicaid, but due to 
her English deficiency and dementia, facilities were unable to provide her with adequate 
care. This forced her daughter to provide at-home care, which Medicaid did not fully cover 
for the number of hours needed. Telephone Interview with Kathy Pryor, supra note 5. 
 191. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Brandon, supra note 12 (noting that 70 percent of retirees who are in poverty 
suffer from acute health conditions). 
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C.  Is Keeping Filial Responsibility Worth it? 
Gaps may exist where a parent is not eligible for Medicaid but 
is still in ―necessitous circumstances.‖ So, next the question be-
comes whether Virginia Code section 20-88 should remain on the 
books to cover such situations. The justification for imposing lia-
bility on innocent adults must be weighed against countervailing 
policies, such as protecting individual autonomy and equal treat-
ment under the law.
193
 In addition, it is necessary to evaluate the 
potential for section 20-88 to unintentionally become a vehicle for 
litigating sour family relationships. 
Whether a state can force an individual to pay for a parent‘s 
needs should depend on what caused the parent‘s poor financial 
situation. There are circumstances where assisted living facilities 
and skilled nursing homes maintain non-Medicaid-covered resi-
dents, but because of the parent‘s poor planning or past folly, the 
parents can no longer foot the bill.
194
 As it stands, section 20-88 
does not take into account the cause of the parent‘s financial ne-
cessity. However, it is unfair to hold innocent children financially 
liable for their parent‘s poor decisions. Last year, a Maryland leg-
islator who was concerned about the law‘s fairness, unsuccessful-
ly attempted to amend Maryland‘s filial responsibility law. He 
pointed out the inequity in holding children ―legally responsible 
for payment‖ when ―[p]arents are able to incur bills and expenses 
without their children having a say.‖
195
 
Filial responsibility imposes an unequal burden among citi-
zens. A child may be liable for her parent‘s expenses while a sib-
ling owes no legal obligation simply because he lives in a state 
without a similar law. Virginia cannot control whether other 
states will hold their residents liable under section 20-88.
196
 This 
 
 193. See supra Part III. 
 194. See, e.g., Health Care & Ret. Corp. of America v. Pittas, 46 A.3d 719, 720 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 2012) (mother left nursing home debt and moved to Greece); Prairie Lakes Health 
Care Sys., Inc. v. Wookey, 583 N.W.2d 405, 409 (S.D. 1998) (parents conveyed real estate 
to children to avoid paying nursing home bill). It should be noted that since most nursing 
homes are certified by Medicare or Medicaid, federal law‘s prohibition on admitting resi-
dents in reliance on a third-party guarantee disqualifies the majority of nursing homes 
from bringing a suit such as in Pittas. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text. 
 195. H.B. 924, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015). 
 196. See Commonwealth v. Mong, 117 N.E.2d 32, 33–34 (Ohio 1954) (holding that Ohio 
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leads to the unjust result of filial responsibility impacting the less 
educated and poorer families.
197
 This higher burden on the poor 
typically arises because families with higher education and 
wealth are more likely to move elsewhere to seek economic oppor-
tunities, education, and changes in lifestyle.
198
 
Virginia‘s filial responsibility statute carries a large potential 
for abuse.
199
 Other states‘ interpretations of their filial responsi-
bility laws have varied widely, leaving any suit based on the stat-
ute completely unpredictable.
200
 In 2013, AARP estimated that 
about forty million Americans voluntarily provided an estimated 
economic value of approximately $470 billion to a family mem-
ber—up from the estimated $450 billion in 2009.
201
 This number 
is actually larger than the amount of money the federal govern-
ment spent on Medicaid that same year.
202
 Thus, it appears most 
Americans do voluntarily care for their aging parents.
203
 The up-
tick in voluntary care may be attributable to the fact that Ameri-
cans are living longer now more than ever.
204
  
There are numerous reasons a child might not provide for his 
or her parent. This may include the statutorily acceptable excuse 
of abandoning the child during youth, or it may simply be due to 
a lack of an emotional bond. A parent‘s actions may not have ris-
en to the level of ―desertion,‖ but nevertheless may have caused a 
strained parent-child relationship. It is in these adversarial cir-
cumstances a filial responsibility statute would be most inequita-
ble.  
Finally, in the recent cases involving Virginia‘s filial responsi-
bility statute, it has not been the parent-child relationship that 
prompted the lawsuit; rather, it has been the tangential relation-
 
law, not Pennsylvania, would determine the liability of an Ohio resident sued under the 
Pennsylvania filial responsibility statute). 
 197. See Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 66. 
 198. See id.; see also Compton & Pollak, supra note 13, at 35–36 (showing an increase 
in correlation between college educated children and proximity of parents). 
 199. See infra Part III.F. 
 200. See Elkins, supra note 11. 
 201. REINHARD ET AL., supra note 56, at 1. 
 202. Id. at 3. 
 203. See id. at 1. 
 204. See LINDSEY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX 
COMPOSITION: 2010 1, 2 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf. 
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ships between other family members that have caused section 20-
88 to be used as a tool for retaliation.
205
 Virginia should not per-
mit its laws to be used in such an unmeritorious fashion and 
must repeal or change the law to prevent similar claims from oc-
curring. 
D.  Should Virginia Follow Others in Repealing the Statute? 
England repealed its filial responsibility statute from which 
section 20-88 is derived in 1948.
206
 Parliament was reacting to a 
social-norm shift; it repealed the duty to support parents while 
simultaneously reaffirming the obligation to support children.
207
 
As Medicaid came into the picture in the United States as ―the 
dominant focus of relief for the poor,‖ states started to also repeal 
filial responsibility statutes.
208
 
Some states viewed the passage of Medicare and Medicaid as 
purporting to alleviate ―an often heavy burden on those obligated 
to pay for assistance under existing State laws.‖
209
 So, the same 
public policy of providing for the aged and indigent that was pre-
viously facilitated through filial support laws remained, but the 
means to achieve this goal was transferred to the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. 
Two states, Idaho and Iowa, very recently repealed their filial 
support statutes for these reasons. In repealing its filial support 
law in 2011, the Idaho legislature believed the law no longer had 
a valid purpose after the passage of Medicaid.
210
 It aimed to repeal 
the law to ―remov[e] the possibility‖ it would be used by individu-
al in Idaho ―in ignorance by county indigency programs or Medi-
caid.‖
211
 Iowa also repealed its filial support statute in 2015 under 
the premise that only the poor person himself is liable for any 
 
 205. See supra Part III.F. 
 206. National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 29 (Eng.).  
 207. Id. 
 208. Pearson, supra note 29, at 271. 
 209. State Welfare Comm‘r v. Mintz, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967) 
(citing McKinney‘s 1966 Session Laws, vol. 2, pp. 2, 2989–90). 
 210. See S.B. 1043, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Id. 2011); see also S.B. 1043, Statement of 
Purpose (Id. 2011). 
 211. S.B. 1043, Statement of Purpose (Id. 2011). 
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debt he may have caused.
212
 Virginia should follow this trend and 
either repeal or reform its filial support statute. 
E.  Potential Cures? 
The most direct remedy to resolve the issues surrounding filial 
support is to repeal Virginia Code section 20-88. Few, if any, Vir-
ginians would be affected,
213
 and it would likely save future citi-
zens from liability for the actions of another. Where Medicaid 
does not provide coverage and the parent cannot support herself 
through no fault of her own, the General Assembly should, at a 
minimum, better define the parameters of when the state re-
quires adult children to contribute for the benefit of their parents. 
―Necessitous circumstances‖ is ambiguous and could lend itself 
to various interpretations.
214
 The 1978 Virginia Circuit Court case 
Peyton v. Peyton does not explicitly re-define ―necessitous circum-
stances‖ but alludes that ―some testimony with respect to certain 
jewelry, oriental rugs and other property possibly titled in the 
Mother‘s name . . . [was in]sufficient to outweigh the evidence of 
necessitous circumstances‖ because no evidence of legal title to 
such property was given.
215
 Overall, this could indicate that the 
burden lies on the defendant to rebut the element of ―necessitous 
circumstances.‖ These unclear elements are daunting for practi-
tioners who aim to understand what standard they should 
prove.
216
 Thus, the Virginia legislature should, at the very least, 
better define this element. Additionally, taking into account the 
 
 212. H.F. 157, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015). 
 213. Idaho‘s repeal of its filial responsibility statute noted there would be zero negative 
fiscal impact. S.B. 1043, Statement of Purpose (Id. 2011). 
 214. Jurisdictions have varied in their interpretations of when one is poor enough for 
its filial support law to be applicable. See Savoy v. Savoy, 641 A.2d 596, 597 (Pa. 1994) 
(holding statute applicable where parent‘s reasonable care and maintenance expenses ex-
ceeded monthly social security income); Pavlick v. Teresinski, 149 A.2d 300, 302 (N.J. Juv. 
& Dom. Rel. Ct. 1959) (holding parent sufficiently indigent despite owning a house and 
furniture). 
 215. 8 Va. Cir. 531, 534 (1978) (Arlington County). It also held social security benefits 
do not qualify as receiving ―public assistance,‖ which would disqualify a section 20-88 ac-
tion. Id. at 532. Richmond attorney R. Shawn Majette disagreed with this finding, noting 
that the purpose of providing Social Security benefits is to essentially provide enough as-
sistance so as one would not be in ―necessitous circumstances.‖ Telephone Interview with 
R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5. 
 216. Patrick Maurer noted the large amount of time spent on defending a suit pursuant 
to section 20-88 because he was concerned the statute‘s ambiguity could lead to negative 
results for his client. Telephone Interview with Patrick Maurer, supra note 3. 
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way in which the parent got into such circumstances would help 
to avoid cases where a person is liable due to an irresponsible 
parent. 
Furthermore, the defenses in the statute should be strength-
ened and better defined. In doing so, the General Assembly could 
help adult children avoid liability for a parent who took little or 
no part in his or her life.
217
 
The statute could also provide more predictability on the 
amount of the obligation one could be subjected to if held liable. 
Virginia provides such predictability when it comes to child sup-
port by taking into account the parent‘s income and other specific 
factors, producing an easy-to-follow guide to determine the child 
support obligation.
218
 A similar type of chart that takes into ac-
count the adult child‘s income, size of family for which he or she 
provides, and the parent‘s expenses would help practitioners 
guide their clients‘ expectations.
219
 Such a guideline would help 
lawyers navigate the ambiguous law and provide uniformity in 
application. 
Lastly, Virginia should eliminate the criminal liability im-
posed.
220
 The aim of the statute is to use a private source to fund 
the elderly, not to punish a child. It makes little sense to impose a 
penalty that is not tailored to the law‘s purpose.
221
 Richmond at-
torney R. Shawn Majette analogized imposing a criminal penalty 
for such a financial obligation to the old-fashioned and unconsti-
tutional debtors‘ prisons.
222
 
 
 217. See, e.g., Cannon v. Juras, 515 P.2d 428, 429–30 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (holding child 
liable for mother who permitted her new husband to expel the child from the home at age 
sixteen). 
 218. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (―Guideline for determination of 
child support‖). 
 219. Attorney R. Shawn Majette noted the difficulty in counseling clients on potential 
liability under the statute and suggested a chart like this would ameliorate some issues. 
See Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5. 
 220. Virginia currently imposes a misdemeanor charge on a person who violates Vir-
ginia Code section 20-88 to ―be punished by a fine not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in 
jail for a period not exceeding twelve months or both.‖ VA. CODE ANN. § 20-88 (Repl. Vol. 
2016). 
 221. See Sisaket, supra note 53, at 98. 
 222. See Telephone Interview with R. Shawn Majette, supra note 5; see also Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (―[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a 
fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the 
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.‖). 
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CONCLUSION 
Virginia should repeal or amend Virginia Code section 20-88 as 
its old-fashioned concepts, unequal coverage, ambiguous re-
quirements, coupled with societal change, federal mandates, and 
potential for abuse far outweigh any actual benefit that might be 
derived by the Commonwealth and its citizens. Imposition of a 
significant long-term financial liability on a person, solely be-
cause of a blood relation, is an antiquated concept that has long 
since passed. 
Sylvia Macon * 
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